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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Geographical Location 
Zambia is a landlocked country neighboring eight countries. It 
covers 750 , 000 square kilometers of land mass and has access to the 
sea through rail, air and road networks linking Zambia with Zaire and 
Angola to the north, Zimbabwe, Botswana, South Africa and Mozambique 
to the south and with Malawi and Tanzania to the east and north- east 
respectively. After 70 years of British rule, Zambia gained self 
rule in 1964. At independence, Zambia's population stood at about 
three million. With annual average population growth rates of 2.5% 
between 1963 and 1969 , 2.9% between 1969 and 1974, 3.1% between 1974 
and 1980, and 3.4% between 1980 and 1985, Zambia's population has 
grown to an estimated seven million. Almost 50% of the people live 
in urban areas giving Zambia one of the biggest urban/rural 
population ratios in Africa. 
Objectives o f the Study 
The main objective of the research study is to address cost 
reduction concerns by applying economic modeling to the maize 
marketing operations in Zambia, with a view of suggesting ways of 
increasing the efficiency of policies in such areas as stocking, 
purchasing, sales and trade. These cost reduction concerns are 
addressed with the use of a dynamic optimization model to derive 
least cost values of government decision variables. However, it 
should be emphasized that the model formulation presented in this 
study does not incorporate stochastic specifications that may be 
necessary for long term strategy planning. The model is strictly 
deterministic in nature and assumes that the scenarios specified 
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below are known to occur well in advance by the policy makers. In 
reality, however, this is not usually the case, especially for the 
unpredictable environmental factors such as drought. To this end, 
therefore, the model should not be used as a blueprint for long term 
marketing operations strategy planning. However, it could be used on 
a yearly basis to determine the least cost levels for the government 
decision variables. This would take the form of solving the model in 
each year without involving future transmission effects. 
Specifically, the objectives of the study are as follows: 
1 . To investigate the effects of changes in important environmental 
and policy variables on such government decision variables as 
maize procurement, opening and closing stocks, sales to millers, 
imports and exports. 
2. To obtain projections of the changes in maize procurement, 
opening and closing stocks , sales to millers, imports and exports 
through the year 2000. 
3. To analyze the short term as well as the longer term policy 
implications of the simulations in the study with a view of 
suggesting more rational policies, especially in the areas of 
inventory control and international trade policies. This would 
take the form of analyzing the tradeoffs between the main 
concerns of policy makers in Zambia, namely cost reduction, 
ensuring adequate consumption, maintaining food security reserve 
stocks, and achieving self reliance by reducing dependence on 
imports and economizing on the use of scarce foreign exchange 
resources. 
The projections in the study will be made using four scenarios: 
1 . In the basic scenario, rainfall is normal every year . 
2. In the basic and foreign exchange scenario , rainfall is normal 
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but there is a 10 to 20\ decline in the foreign exchange reserves 
(or aid). 
3. In the drought scenario, rainfall is 10 to 20\ below normal in 
some of the 16 projection years. 
4. In the drought and foreign exchange scenario, a 10 or 20\ decline 
in foreign exchange reserves (or aid) will be added to the 
rainfall shortfall. 
The last three scenarios indicate the impact of the two major 
external shocks, i.e., rainfall and foreign exchange availability 
that affect the maize sector in Zambia. 
Data Sources and Methodology 
This study utilizes secondary data collected during a research 
trip to Zambia between June and August of 1988. In Zambia, the 
difficulties in collecting data and in some cases the nonavailability 
of it is a well documented fact. The data were collected from 
institutional documents as well as by way of interviews with 
officials in these institutions. The main sources were: (1) 
Planning Division, Ministry of Agriculture, (2) Central Statistical 
Office, (3) NAMBOARD, (4) ZCF and the Provincial Cooperative Unions, 
(5) the then Ministry of Cooperatives, (6) Bank of Zambia, (7) 
Meteorological Department, and (8) Ministry of Planning and Finance. 
Unfortunately, the big gaps in the time series data collected 
could not enable the proper and adequate estimation of policy 
variable equations using econometrics techniques. In some cases, 
time series data observations only went as far back as 1982. It is 
possible that a more coordinated data collection effort coupled with 
more time provision for data analysis to look for and accommodate 
substitute and complementary data, could have yielded more data to 
warranc the inclusion of an econometric analysis. 
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CHAPTER II. GENERAL CONDITI ONS 
The Economy 
Since the 1930s when large scale extract ion of mineral resources 
was s tarted, Zambia's economy has traditionally relied on the mining 
industry, specifically the copper industry which provides more than 
90% of all foreign exchange earnings. The high copper prices that 
prevailed in the 1960s and 1970s provided Zambia with huge foreign 
exchange reserves and encouraged the development of a highly import 
o riented and capital intensive production and consumption economic 
structure. However, while the mining sector and the Zambian economy 
in general experienced great prosperity, growth in some of the other 
sectors , more especially in the agricultural sector, slowed down and 
even stagnated in some cases . Since 1973, however , copper prices on 
the world market have continued to fall drastically and this has led 
to a tremendous deplet ion of Zambia's export earnings and foreign 
exchange reserves result i ng in tremendous adverse effects on the 
mining industry and on the Zambian economy in general. The situation 
has been aggravated by the steady rise in the costs of imported 
inputs , and this has made Zambia ' s import oriented economy very 
vulnerable to these external shocks. It has also led to a sharp 
deterioration in Zambia's terms of trade during the l ast decade, 
thereby greatly reducing t he country ' s ability to import. 
Fiscal and monetary adjustments were started by the government 
as a way of redressing the economic situation. In 1983, the 
g overnment introduced major macroeconomic policy changes that 
included price decontrols, relaxation of interest rate ceilings and 
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devaluation of the currency (23). However, price controls on maize 
and fertilizer still remained in place. 
In 1985, a foreign exchange auction system was introduced . 
Through the auction of the f o reign exchange, the value of the Zambian 
Kwacha was allowed to be freely determined by the supply and demand 
situation prevailing in each week. ns a resu l t , the exchange rate 
fell from K2.20 per US $1 before the auctio n to K5.1 5 per US $1 in 
the first auct i on to K8.07 per US $1 in mid-July 1986 ( 23), and 
eventually reached a high of K21.00 per US $1 by 1987 before the 
government finally intervened to fix the exchange rate at K8.00 per 
us $1. 
Table 1. Index of impor15 
(1970 = lOO)a, 
Import 
Year Price Index 
1970 100 
1971 105 
1972 111 
1973 126 
1974 157 
1975 194 
1976 217 
1977 248 
1978 299 
1979 374 
1980 486 
1981 584 
1982 695 
aZNCDP (34). 
bWorld Bank (29). 
and export prices and terms of trade 
Export Terms of 
Price Index Trade Index 
100 100 
78 74 
80 72 
117 9 3 
134 85 
84 43 
100 46 
97 39 
103 35 
185 50 
201 41 
198 34 
180 26 
The Agric ultural Sector 
The diminishing ability for Zambia to import due to low 
copper earnings has brought renewed impetus to the need f o r the 
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diversification of the economy and also to encourage greater use of 
the domestic resource base. As a result, the Third National 
Development Plan targeted agriculture as the priority sector in the 
transformation of the economy (35). The economic development 
strategy for Zambia was aimed at making the agricultural sector the 
mainstay of the economy in place of the mining industry. The main 
argument for this strategy is that the agricultural sector can play a 
major role in the transformation process given that it is the least 
dependent secto r on imported inputs and that Zambia's agricultural 
potential has only been marginally exploited. This is evident in the 
fact that less than 5% of the land area is under permanent cultiva-
tion despite the inherent fertility of most of Zambia's soils (38). 
The development of this sector would not only amount to substantial 
savings of foreign exchange through food import substitution, it 
would also generate the much needed foreign exchange through in-
creases in agricultural exports which at present account for less 
than 2% of Zambia's total exports (23). 
Of all the crops grown, maize is by far the most important crop 
in Zambia since it is the staple food for the great majority of 
Zambians. As a result, maize policy forms the backbone for agricul-
tural policy in Zambia. 
Much attention has been devoted to increasing production and 
productivity in the maize sector by way of instituting support 
programs aimed mainly at the small scale farmers who are yet to enter 
the maize market. The emergence of this abundant resource base into 
surplus producers for the market is perceived not only to play a 
significant role in eliminating maize imports, it is also seen as 
having great potential to provide more maize surpluses for exports. 
Import substitution of maize would, therefore, amount to big savings 
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in foreign exchange , and maize surpluses, which culminate into 
exports, would provide foreign exchange earnings for the country. 
Maize marketing arrangements 
Commercial maize production in Zambia is known to have been 
taking place as far back as the 1890s even though a controlled 
pricing system was never in place then. However, during the 
depression of the 1930s when all but two mines were closed (6), 
demand for maize drastically dropped leaving an excess supply of the 
commodity . This situation also put downward pressure on maize prices 
and was interpreted by the colonial government as a threat to the 
welfare of the white settler farmers . 
As a remedy for this situation, the colonial government 
established a Maize Control Board in 1936 with the purpose of 
regulating maize marketings . Through the Maize Control Board, the 
colonial government introduced a quota system in which white settler 
farmers were guaranteed three quarters (3/4) of the maize market 
share and higher prices for their produce. On the other hand, 
indigenous farmers were allocated the remaining one quarter (1 / 4) of 
the maize market share and were offered lower prices for the same 
produce. 
In this way, the colonial government intended to support maize 
producer prices above world prices for white settler farmers and also 
remove the threat of competition from indigenous farmers. This was 
consistent with the colonial government's efforts to attract and 
retain white settler farmers in Zambia, then Northern Rhodesia. To 
this end, the best land was allocated to settler farmers and indig-
enous black farmers who lived in areas deemed desirable for white 
settlers were forced to migrate to other parts o f the country (6) . 
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One of the most notable constraints to increased maize produc-
tion and productivity in Zambia is marketing. Increasing the 
effectiveness of the marketing system, therefore, can have a 
tremendous positive impact on the efficiency of the maize sector and 
the overall agricultural sector in general . Efficient marketing 
arrangements play a major role in agricultural development through 
( 5) : 
1. providing farmers with signals about products and crops in which 
to specialize. 
2. easing access to new technologies for farmers by providing the 
necessary inputs if and when needed . 
3. managing an efficient distribution system of the food surpluses 
needed from the widely distributed and sparse rural population to 
feed the large urban population. Given that Zambia is one of the 
most urbanized African countries with almost 50\ of the 
population living in urban areas and that maize is the staple 
food for most Zambians, this function of the marketing system is 
of particular importance in serving the urban population which 
does not directly engage in food production. 
At the time of Zambia's independence in 1964, maize marketing was 
being administered by the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), the 
Agricultural Rural Marketing Board (ARMB), and a number of producer 
cooperatives. The Agricultural Rural Marketing Board and the 
producer cooperatives operated maize buying points throughout the 
country and acted as middlemen between producers and the Grain 
Marketing Board which controlled the storage facilities. 
Since 1969, however, maize marketing in Zambia has been governed 
by an act of parliament that brought into existence the National 
Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMBOARD) . NAMBOARD had the exclusive 
9 
statutory powers to purchase maize from farmers and sell it to 
millers who process it into maize meal for sale to consumers. 
NAMBOARD also had the responsibility of importing maize in times of 
shortages and exporting maize in times of surpluses. In addition to 
this, NAMBOARD was placed in charge of maintaining strategic national 
food reserves. In 1981, however, NAMBOARD's responsibility as the 
sole buyer of maize from farmers was curtailed and restricted only to 
interprovincial transfers of maize and also to deal with maize 
imports or exports if a deficit or surplus occurs . Purchase of maize 
in each of the nine provinces became the responsibility of the 
Provincial Cooperative Unions. NAMBOARD's role in the domestic 
market was reduced to that of buying excess maize supplies in the 
surplus provinces and make it available to the deficit provinces in 
addition to its statutory responsibility for importing or exporting 
maize as well as importing fertilizers based on the national require-
ments. The imported fertilizers are stored in the NAMBOARD main 
depots and are sold from there to Provincial Cooperative Unions and 
private traders who in turn make the fertilizers available to the 
farmers. 
In spite of all these changes, however, the government continued 
to fix producer prices of maize and the retail prices for consumers. 
Since 1980, nominal producer prices have been increased considerably 
but the government still faces the awkward situation of wanting to 
set high producer prices in order to encourage increased production 
to meet domestic food, employment and development needs but at the 
same time, due to strong political pressure from urban consumers and 
also humanitarian considerations for the low income consumers, the 
government would like to keep retail prices low enough for these 
diverse interest groups . This state of affairs has resulted into a 
INT'NAL 
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Figure 1. Maize marketing channel in Zambia 
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complex system of subsidies in maize marketing operations and at very 
high cost to the government. 
Major policy reforms have been pronounced in an effort to 
redress this situation. The most significant one was the liberaliza-
tion of maize marketing in 1986. Under this new arrangement, private 
individuals within each province were invited to participate in the 
marketing of maize, and NAMBOARD only remained with the responsi-
bility of acting as the buyer of last resort and also dealing with 
imports or exports. Liberalizing the market was expected to provide 
the necessary competition needed to allow for efficiency in maize 
marketing and thus reduce marketing costs not only for government 
agents but for the entire system as well. However, in spite of all 
these marketing reforms, government marketing costs have continued to 
rise. Maize marketing operations i n Zambia incur high marketing 
costs mainly due to the following factors pertaining: 
1. the sparse population of Zambia (one person per five square 
kilometers) , makes it more costly to distribute inputs and 
produce. 
2 . the poor state of rural roads and communicatio ns. 
3. high real interest r ates payments by government marketing 
agencies to commercial banks on funds borrowed to facilitate 
marketing operations. This situation arises partly due to the 
delay in government restitutions to these agencies. 
4. huge storage losses due to inadequate proper storage facilities . 
5 . poor maintenance and operation of processing facilities 
especially in the light of Zambia's current problems in acquiring 
working capital or spare parts. 
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Pricing policy 
During the colonial period, marketing services were restricted 
to Southern, Central and later Eastern Provinces, leaving farmers in 
other provinces with no government guaranteed markets (17) . After 
independence, marketing services were expanded with the inception of 
NAMBOARD in the 1968/69 crop season. Deliberate efforts were now 
made towards providing extensive and guaranteed markets for agricul-
tural produce in the other provinces as well. 
Price discrimination practices in favor of settler farmers were 
discontinued at independence time in 1964 and for the 1968/69 crop 
season, a regional pricing system covering the whole country was put 
in place. This price regime offered higher producer prices to 
farmers in deficit regions and lower prices to farmers in surplus 
regions. Offering higher prices in the deficit regions was intended 
to act as a catalyst to increase maize production in those regions. 
Consequently, increased production in those regions would greatly 
reduce the amount of maize imports from the surplus regions and 
therefore reduce the huge gross expenditure on maize haulage. 
For the 1970/71 crop marketing season, a floor price of K3.20 
for a 90 kilogram bag was guaranteed for farmers in all regions (17) . 
This floor price was higher than the prevailing prices in the surplus 
provinces under the regional pricing system. This new arrangement of 
guaranteeing a minimum price for farmers in all regions was intended 
to stimulate more production in all regions in light of the decline 
in maize production in the previous year. 
In April 1973, a uniform pricing system was adopted. Under this 
system, producer prices in all regions were fixed at the same level. 
Equity considerations among farmers were cited to support the intr o -
duction of a uniform pricing system. However, this is difficult to 
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justify given that different regions face different production costs 
(17). A more equitable system might be to provide higher prices to 
farmers in higher production cost areas so that income levels even 
out. Nevertheless, under the uniform pricing system, the government 
continued to adjust the fixed prices based on perceived changes in 
the cost of production. 
In 1984, a floor (minimum) pricing system was introduced for all 
agricultural commodities except maize. Under this system, producers 
were guaranteed minimum prices for their produce, and they were free 
to negotiate for higher prices with marketing agents. However, in 
the case of small scale farmers, lack of organized power to negotiate 
for higher prices has resulted in a situation whereby the floor 
prices still constitute the selling prices for these farmers (9). 
The 1986 liberalization of marketing arrangements in Zambia did 
not change much of maize pricing policy. Pricing of maize still 
remained the prerogative of the government to set producer prices 
based on perceived accounting production costs incurred by farmers 
and also allowing for a margin of profitability. 
Maize supplies in the official marketing system 
Maize supplies in the official marketing system come from three 
primary sources: 
1. maize procurement. 
2. carry-over stocks from the previous year. 
3. imports whenever there is a shortfall in domestic sources. 
Maize procurements Maize procurements are a major source of 
supplies accounting for over 95% of available supplies in a given 
good year. In times of environmental disruptions such as too little 
rainfall or too much of it, maize imports have been used to 
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fill in the shortfall arising from inadequate marketings and stocks. 
Since maize production in Zambia is heavily dependent on rainfall, 
procurements share of total supplies have been fluctuating from year 
to year in response to fluctuations in maize production. 
Table 2. 
Year 
1964/65 
1965 / 66 
1966/67 
1967/68 
1968/69 
1969/70 
1970/71 
1971/72 
1972/73 
1973/74 
1974/75 
1975/76 
1976/77 
1977/78 
1978/79 
1979/80 
1980/81 
1981/82 
1982/83 
1983/84 
1984/ 85 
1985/86 
Statutory producer prices of grain maize (per 90 kg bag} 
for various grades (A,B,C,D,E} over the yearsa 
Grade 
A B c 
(K) ( K} ( K) 
3 . 72 3.68 3.58 
3 . 32 3.28 3.18 
3.10 3.05 2 . 95 
2.90 2.85 2.75 
3.20 3.15 3.05 
3.50 3.45 3.35 
4.00 3.95 3.85 
4.30 4.25 4.15 
4.30 4.25 4.15 
4.30 4.25 4.15 
5.30 4.95 4.85 
6.30 6.20 6.05 
6.30 6.20 6.05 
6 . 80 6. 75 6.70 
9.20 9.10 8.95 
11. 70 11.60 11. 40 
13.50 13.45 13.25 
16.00 15.90 15.85 
18.30 18.20 18.05 
24.50 24.35 24.15 
28 . 50 28.35 28.15 
55.00 
aPlanning Division, Ministry of Agriculture. 
Maize stock ho ldings In considering the need for national 
food security, the government's objective has been to set up and 
maintain an adequate maize buffer stock to counter the seasonal 
supply fluctuations. This buffer stock is required to ensure the 
availability of maize supply, equivalent to three to s i x months of 
maize market demand, within the country at any given time of the year 
15 
(19) . The relief provided by this buffer stock in times of shortages 
would allow enough time for the government to arrange for the impor-
tation of additional maize supplies (19). In recent pronouncements, 
however, a specific figure of 2.5 million 90 kilogram bags of maize 
has been referred to as the targeted minimum maize reserve 
stock level. This is equivalent to about four months' supply of 
maize market demand. 
The parastatal marketing agency, NAMBOARD, is the appointed 
administrator of this maize reserve stock since it already has the 
necessary infrastructure as well as the management potential to 
manage such maize stock levels. 
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Food Security 
Assistance Scheme has particularly been very active in giving advice 
on how best to arrange such maize reserve stocks. The main elements 
of the FAO stockholding guidelines are that (28): 
1. On 1st November, after domestic crop procurement are completed, 
an estimate be made of national stocks that would exist on 1st 
June in the following year based on historical consumption 
trends; 
2. If the 1st June carry over stock amounted to less t han three 
months market demand, grain would be imported to bring 1st June 
stocks up to three months supply; 
3 . If the 1st June stocks were estimated to exceed six months 
demand, an export programme to remove the surpluses would be 
organized. 
Past trends in actual stockholdinq The government has tried 
to ensure the stability of the national food security situation by 
instituting an early warning system through which the government 
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tries to estimate expected production levels as well as expected crop 
pro curement. By utilizing this system, necessary i mport or export 
arrangements are initiated to take care of t he anticipated shortfall 
or surplus. 
Maintaining minimum stock levels of 2.S million 90 kilogram 
baga1 o f maize at t he e nd of May hae been hard to realize since 1979. 
Import requirements have inc reased during the 1980s , a nd security 
reserve stocks at the end of May have been equivalent to one month 
maize supply or l ess f or all t he years, except d uring 1982 when an 
equivalent of abou t two months maize supply was in reserve at t he end 
of May (28). 
Ineffic i ent ma nagement of maize stocks arising mainly from lack 
of adequate proper storage faci l ities and constraining financial 
outlays, in particul ar f o reign exchange, has been cited as h ampering 
the realization of the o fficial goal of maintaining a stable maize 
reserve stock at all times. 
Maize trade policy: international NAMBOARD is the only 
marketing agent authorized to deal with internatio n a l maize markets . 
In times of anticipated shortfalls , NJ\MBOARD, in consultation with 
t h e government, le required to import maize into the count r y in good 
time to avert maize shortages . In the same way, NAMBOARD c arries out 
the function o f exporting maize whenever there is more than the 
requ ired domestic surpluses . Lack of adequate proper storage 
fac ilities puts more pressure on the need to export dur ing a big 
surplus year . 
Maize trade policy: domestic Despite t he liberalization o f 
the marketing s y stem in 1986 to inc lude private agents a s well, 
1The Prime Minister referred to this stock l evel in M~rch 1986. 
17 
movement of maize from province to province in response to demand and 
supply situations is done only by NAM.BOARD in accordance with the 
stipulations of the government. NAM.BOARD purchases maize in the 
surplus regions and transfers it for sale in the deficit regions. 
NAM.BOARD, in this instance, carries out the function of watchdog in 
seeing to it that maize requirements in each region are satisfied. 
NAMBOARD's maize sales are restricted to registered millers and a 
small number of industrial processors. The latter group is allocated 
maize for commercial purposes only after the demand for maize by 
millers for meali-meal requirements have been satisfied. 
Table 3. Imports of maize into Zambia, 1980-1985a,b 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Tonnes 288,000 93,000 68,000 101,000 126,000 
000 bags 3,200 1,033 756 1,122 
aNAMBOARD Grain Marketing Department. 
bworld Bank ( 28) . 
Table 4. NAMBOARD's transportation costs (K ' OOO)a,b 
Year Maize 
1978 15,115 
1979 12,488 
1980 16,000 
1981 13,464 
1982 21,000 
aNAMBOARD ( 21 ) . 
b Che 11 a, S. S . V. ( 3 ) • 
Fertilizer 
6,575 
4,705 
8,000 
6,000 
7,425 
1,400 
1985 
109,000 
1,211 
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Table 5. Grain maize exports to selected countries, 1968-1978a,b 
Year 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
azcso (30). 
Country 
China 
Botswana 
Zaire 
China 
Zaire 
Belgium 
Zaire 
Zaire 
Tanzania 
Zaire 
Tanzania 
Zaire 
Zaire 
Mozambique 
Malawi 
Angola 
Tanzania 
Zaire 
1\ngola 
Rwanda 
Zaire 
bChella, s. S. v. (3) . 
Quantity 
(Metric Tonnes) 
21 , 762 
270 
41,462 
1,062 
7,314 
60 
153 
8 ,44 5 
1,895 
3 
50,082 
69,133 
42,079 
16,621 
8,507 
302 
22,007 
31 
3 , 568 
21,903 
50 
39 , 332 
Value 
(K=Kwacha) 
963 ,304 
9,000 
1,865,615 
44,849 
328 , 933 
4,285 
172,280 
100,128 
266 
2,642,655 
4,959,268 
2,672 , 695 
1,433,781 
495 , 715 
17,186 
3,136,225 
4,318 
376 , 868 
322,515 
7,367 
4,633,510 
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Table 6. Estimated maize demanda 
Population Demand (. 000 x 90 K bags) 
consuming 
Year (in millions) Total Market Industrial Total 
Urban Total food food Feed usage demand 
1975 1. 758 3.9 10 , 756 4 , 850 340 485 11, 581 
1976 1.876 4 . 0 11 , 037 5,176 362 518 11 , 917 
1977 2 . 002 4.1 11 , 312 5,523 387 552 12 , 251 
1978 2 . 136 4.3 11, 862 5,893 412 589 12,864 
1979 2.279 4.5 12,415 6 , 288 440 629 13,484 
1980 2 . 440 4.7 12,967 6,732 471 673 14 , 111 
1981 2.603 4 . 8 13,502 7,181 503 718 14,723 
1982 2 . 777 5.0 13 , 794 7,661 536 766 15,096 
1983 2 . 960 5.3 14,662 8,174 572 817 16, 011 
1985 3 . 374 5.7 15,726 9,309 652 930 17 , 308 
1990 4 . 666 7.1 19,588 12,873 901 1,287 21,776 
1995 6.453 9.1 25,106 17,803 1,246 1,780 28,132 
2000 8.923 11. 7 32,279 24,618 1 , 723 2,462 36 , 4 25 
aChella, s. s. v. ( 3) . 
Table 7. Maize p5ocurements, imports and stocks, 1976-85 (000 
bags)a, 
Market 
demand 
5 , 675 
6 , 056 
6 , 462 
6,894 
7,357 
7,876 
8,402 
8 , 963 
9,563 
10,891 
15,061 
20,829 
28,803 
Year Procurement Imports Stocks at end of May 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
8,332 0 
7,819 0 
6,462 0 
3,734 700 
4,193 3 ,200 
7,610 1,033 
5,671 756 
5,899 1,122 
6,348 1,400 
7,070 1,211 
aNAMBOARD Grain Marketing Division. 
b World Bank (28). 
2 , 966 
2,924 
3 , 339 
3,167 
405 
719 
1,201 
906 
682 
288 
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Table 8. Maize imports by source, 1985 (000 bags)a,b 
Count r y of supply 
Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe 
Malawi 
Malawi 
China 
E.E.C. 
Type 
white 
white 
white 
white 
white 
yellow 
yellow 
Quantity received 
554 
165 
37 
415 
5 
27 
5 
1,208 
aNAMBOARD Grain Marketing Division. 
bworld Bank (28). 
Financing arrangement 
commercial 
E.E.C. aid 
F.A.O. aid 
commercial 
WFP to SWAPO 
Chinese aid 
UNHCR 
Table 9 . Maize imports by month, 1985 (000 bags)a,b 
Month Quantity Month 
January 16 July 
February 19 August 
March 67 September 
April 35 October 
May 180 November 
June 362 December 
Total: 
aNAMBOARD Grain Marketing Division. 
bworld Bank (28). 
Quantity 
298 
181 
56 
4 
0 
0 
1,208 
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Table 10. Population pro~ectione by province and residence, 1980-
2000 ( OOO's)a , 
Province Residence 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Central Total 512 616 749 916 1 ,1 24 
Urban 147 216 309 434 600 
Rural 365 400 439 482 524 
Copperbelt Total 1,251 1,549 1,946 2,457 3 ,106 
Urban 1,131 1,417 1,802 2 , 299 2,934 
Rural 120 131 11\4 158 172 
Eastern Total 651 741 847 974 1,121 
Urban 54 87 129 187 264 
Rural 597 654 718 787 857 
Luapula Total 421 475 539 613 698 
Urban 38 56 79 109 149 
Rural 383 419 460 505 549 
Lusaka Total 691 910 1,212 1 , 608 2 ,124 
Urban 550 756 1 , 042 1 ,4 22 1,922 
Rural 141 154 169 186 202 
Northern Total 675 757 852 960 1,081 
Urban 95 1 22 154 195 248 
Rural 580 635 698 765 832 
North- Total 303 351 407 476 557 
western Urban 18 39 65 101 149 
Rural 285 312 342 376 409 
Southern Total 672 791 936 1,114 1,330 
Urban 167 238 328 448 606 
Rural 505 553 607 666 725 
Western Total 486 535 586 640 695 
Urban 58 66 71 75 81 
Rural 428 469 515 564 614 
Total Total 5,662 6,725 8,073 9 ,7 58 11, 836 
Zambia Urban 2,259 2 , 998 3,979 5 ,2 69 6,953 
Rural 3,403 3,7 27 4,094 4,489 4,884 
azcso (31). 
bworld Bank ( 28). 
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Table 11. Per capita consumption 
meal, 1980a 
(kilogram per year) of mealie 
Per capita consumption 
Province Residence Meal Maize % Marketed 
Central Total 150.4 172 .1 79 
Urban 98.2 115. 5 100 
Rural 171.4 194.8 70 
Copperbelt Total 98.3 115. 2 99 
Urban 97.2 114.4 100 
Rural 108.4 123.2 90 
Eastern Total 139.8 159.2 50 
Urban 102.6 120.7 100 
Rural 143.2 162.7 45 
Luasula Total 37.6 43.0 73 
Urban 88.1 103.6 100 
Rural 32.5 36.9 70 
Lusaka Total 113. l 131. 7 98 
Urban 98.2 115 . 5 100 
Rural 171. 4 194.8 90 
Northern Total 42.3 48.6 2 7 
Urban 95.3 112 .1 100 
Rural 33 . 6 38.2 15 
North- Total 50.2 57.3 53 
western Urban 104.2 122. 6 100 
Rural 46.8 53.2 50 
Southern Total 146.8 168.0 70 
Urban 121. 7 143 . 2 100 
Rural 155.1 176 . 3 60 
Western Total 90.9 103.8 4 7 
Urban 95.4 112 .2 100 
Rural 90.3 102.6 40 
Total Total 100.9 116.3 70 
Zambia Urban 99.2 116. 7 100 
Rural 102.l 116.0 51 
aworld Bank ( 2 8) . 
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Table 12. Markete d maize consumption (in 000 tonnes)a 
Province Residence 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Central Total 58 69 83 100 122 
Urban 14 21 30 43 59 
Rural 44 48 53 58 63 
Copperbelt Total 122 151 189 239 302 
Urban 110 138 175 223 285 
Rural 12 13 14 15 17 
Eastern Total 50 58 68 80 95 
Urban 7 10 16 23 32 
Rural 44 48 53 58 63 
Luasula Total 14 17 20 24 30 
Urban 4 6 8 11 15 
Rural 10 11 12 13 14 
Lusaka Total 88 114 150 197 257 
Urban 64 87 120 164 222 
Rural 25 27 30 33 35 
Northern Total 14 17 21 26 33 
Urban 11 14 17 22 28 
Rural 3 4 4 4 5 
North- Total 10 13 17 22 29 
western Urban 2 5 8 12 18 
Rural 8 8 9 10 11 
Southern Total 77 93 111 135 163 
Urban 24 34 47 64 87 
Rural 53 58 64 70 77 
Western Total 24 27 29 32 34 
Urban 7 7 8 8 9 
Rural 18 19 21 23 25 
Total Total 464 570 706 880 1,100 
Zambia Urban 264 350 465 615 812 
Rural 201 220 241 265 288 
Total Total Marketed Maize (+ beer, stockfeed use) 
Zambia Total 6,450 7,475 8,799 10,489 12,626 
Urban 3,662 4,501 5,615 7,078 8,989 
Rural 2,788 2,974 3,184 3,411 3,637 
aworld Bank ( 28). 
Table 13 . White maize intake by off ~ial marketing organizations by province, 1973-198S (in 
thousands of 90 kg bags) a , ' c 
Harvest Copper North Zambia 
Year Central belt Eastern Luapula Lusaka Northern Western Southern Western Total 
1973 2,SlO 132 SOl 16 * 99 26 l , 171 lS 4 , 470 
1974 3,784 2S 622 16 * 67 29 1,970 30 6,543 
1975 2,844 33 790 18 * 113 29 2,336 74 6,237 
1976 3,948 72 912 25 * 184 38 3,073 80 8,332 
1977 2 , 965 70 924 32 413 212 40 3,077 86 7,819 
1978 2,164 Sl 772 34 254 203 34 2,911 39 6 , 462 
1979 1,234 42 Sl7 18 181 121 32 1,SSS 34 3,734 
"' 1980 1 , S24 3S 739 18 197 118 lS l,S34 13 4,193 ... 
1981 2 ,591 38 1,182 29 323 328 41 3,036 42 7,610 
1982 1. 685 66 1,273 so 218 649 so 1,642 38 S, 671 
1983 2,238 90 1,598 40 217 644 51 970 Sl S,899 
1984 2,118 134 1,849 71 193 7Sl 67 1 , 076 89 6,348 
198S 2,232 242 1,780 S9 267 740 7S 1,S84 91 7,070 
aZMAWD ( 32) . 
bNAMBOARD and Provincial Cooperative Unions. 
cWorld Bank ( 28) . 
*Included in Central Provinces. 
Table 14. NAMBOARD maize purchases by month, 1976-1985 (in thousands of 90 kg bags)a,b 
Harvest 
Year May June July August September October November December Total 
1976 0 64 616 1,947 3 , 380 1,235 512 0 7,656 
1977 0 124 804 1,540 2, 913 1,886 389 0 7 , 656 
1978 0 90 732 1,238 2 , 168 1,249 961 1 6,440 
1979 0 23 861 1,752 906 159 5 1 3 , 707 
1980 30 240 569 959 1,554 795 53 0 4,200 
1981 0 201 960 1 , 618 1,010 1,441 237 47 5,513 I\.) V'I 
1982 0 87 140 706 769 504 330 340 2,875 
1983 0 143 305 522 467 421 382 254 2,493 
1984 4 64 111 579 422 598 525 0 2 , 302 
1985 13 217 965 2,374 2,121 1,318 142 0 7,151 
aNAMBOARD Grain Marketing Department. 
b World Bank ( 28). 
Table 15 . Maize sales ~ official marketing organizations by province, 1972-1985 (in thousands of 
90 kg bags) a, 'c 
Harvest Copper North Zambia 
Year Central belt Eastern Luapula Lusaka Northern Western Southern Western Total 
1972 1,274 2,129 n.a. * n.a. 393 n.a . 3,796 
1973 1,698 2,346 n.a. * n.a. 560 n.a. 4,604 
1974 1 , 719 2,635 n.a. * n.a. 557 n . a. 4 , 911 
1975 2,350 2,666 n . a. * n.a. 667 n.a. 5,683 
1976 2,412 2,512 92 * 19 673 35 5,743 
1977 2,472 2,651 197 * 98 612 69 6,099 
1978 964 3,004 89 269 1,854 63 92 718 123 7,176 
1979 851 2,755 120 285 1,753 95 144 755 165 6,923 "" 1980 817 2,483 180 271 1 , 462 110 124 886 209 6 , 542 C1' 
1981 732 2,742 175 229 1,408 184 146 1 , 104 237 6,957 
1982 746 3,036 366 191 1,378 165 120 903 254 7 , 159 
1983 711 2,866 638 141 1,438 261 130 976 292 7,453 
1984 736 3,122 312 118 1,581 240 111 971 274 7,465 
1985 705 3,614 157 104 1,366 303 136 886 226 7,497 
aZMAWD ( 32). 
bNAMBOARD and Provincial Cooperative Unions. 
cWorld Bank ( 28) . 
*Included in Central Province . 
Table 16. NAM BOARD maize stocks at month end 1975-1986 (in thousands of 90 kg bags)a,b 
Year Jan . Feb. March April May June July Aug . Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. 
1975 4,623 4,128 3,665 3,197 2,765 2,455 3,159 4,449 5,825 6,002 5,555 4,979 
1976 4,401 4,358 3 , 902 3,419 2,966 2,966 2,765 4 , 218 7,053 7,512 6 , 805 5,862 
1977 5 , 461 4,936 4,375 3,616 2,924 2 , 924 3, 110 3,367 4 , 462 6,789 7,178 6, 613 
1978 5,826 5,318 4 , 687 3,869 3,339 3,339 2,389 3,195 4,128 5,414 5 , 588 5,059 
1979 4,483 3,966 3,366 1,767 2,167 2,167 1 , 558 2,880 2,875 2,526 1,975 2,076 
1980 1,547 1,021 764 700 405 905 1,684 2,435 3,447 3,768 3,427 2,862 
1981 2 , 270 2,011 1,450 1,100 719 600 1 , 151 2 , 010 3,301 3,655 3,635 3,324 
"' 1982 2,663 2,222 1,705 1 , 321 1,201 942 1,098 1,187 1,640 1,915 1 , 824 1,638 -.J 
1983 1,540 1 , 321 1,084 952 906 973 1,150 1,446 1,683 1,780 1,713 1 ,548 
1984 1,420 1,272 1,009 824 682 541 435 606 787 1,085 1,152 1,015 
1985 774 23 455 374 288 405 1,169 2,035 3,079 4,771 4,805 4,147 
1986 3,470 2,755 2,010 1,454 
aNAMBOARD Grain Marketing Department. 
b World Bank ( 28). 
28 
CHAPTER III. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
Literature Revie~ 
From the time of Zambia's independence in 1964, some empirical 
studies have been carried out on the maize sector in Zambia and 
particularly the ma.rketing aspect of it. The most recent ones have 
been done in the past five years. 
Dennis Pervis (22), in his study of the management of maize 
distribution in Zambia, used a linear programming transportation 
model to estimate optimum flows of maize from districts of production 
to districts of main storage , and from districts of main storage to 
districts of milling, and, finally, from districts of milling to 
districts of retailing. The model was run on microcomputers, and 
since microcomputers have very limited capacity for such large 
models, the model had to be broken down into sub models which were 
run separately . This type of optimization does not allow for the 
simultaneity effects in the optimization of maize movements . 
However , this does not pose a serious setback in the model since most 
of maize marketed in Zambia is restricted to follow the pattern of 
movement as indicated by the sub models. 
In a study of the supply response of maize in Zambia, Suba (24) 
used the Nerlovian modeling technique, which is based on adaptive 
expectations t heory , to investigate t he variations in maize output. 
The study indicates that maize producer price and rainfall, among 
other variables , generally provide strong explanations for the 
variations in maize supply in Zambia . 
Muntanga (17), in evaluating the uniform pricing system for 
maize in Zambia , used a transportation model to determine regional 
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price differentials and maize optimum flows between regions. 
Optimization in this study was done under competitive conditions with 
exogenously given transportation costs per unit. 
Mwanaumo (20), in a study on the evaluation of the marketing 
system for maize in Zambia, looked at ways of minimizing the 
processing, storage and transportation costs in the maize marketing 
system. The focus of the study was on minimizing the marketing costs 
covered by government s ubsidies using linear programming techniques. 
Pricing policy implications arising from these activities were also 
investigated, and the study indicated that substantial savings could 
be realized in the cost structure of the maize marketing system in 
Zambia. 
The CEAP Project Report Number 4 (2) outlines a maize policy 
model for Zambia. The study itself does not draw any policy recom-
mendations. Its intended purpose is for use by personnel in the 
agriculture sector of Zambia, especially those dealing with policy 
analysis. The model indicates expected levels of maize production, 
retention, marketings, import needs, producer revenues and government 
costs associated with producer and consumer subsidies as well as 
import costs. 
Other studies of this nature have been applied to marketing 
systems elsewhere in the third world countries. Of major interest to 
this study are the economic modeling techniques utilized by Raj 
Krishna and Ajay Chhibber (15) of India in their study of the wheat 
marketing system in India. The study incorporates econometric 
modeling techniques to analyze the Indian wheat marketing structure 
and finally optimization techniques are utilized to derive least cost 
government decision variables. The study indicates that large 
savings can be introduced in the Indian wheat marketing system by 
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pursuing rational policies. The general economic modeling techniques 
applied in the Kriehna-Chhlbber study form the background for this 
etudy, 2 and some comparisons between the two marketing systems in 
India and Zambia will be made in this study where necessary. 
The Dynamic Optimization Model 
In view of the high cost of maize marketing operations in 
Zambia, the research study will examine whether this coat can be 
reduced while allowing maize consumption to continue to grow over the 
projection period. To this effect, alternative projections under the 
four scenarios will be made using a dynamic optimization model with 
alternative assumptions, to obtain optimal least cost values of 
government policy variables for the same 16 year projection period. 
In this dynamic optimizing model, the sum of the present value of the 
annual cost of maize marketing operations over t he projection period 
will be minimized subject to inequalities that reflect the concerns 
of policy makers. 
The model developed in this study is dynamic in nature. The 
dynamic optimization model involves sequential transmission of 
situations . Each decision at present time takes into account future 
impacts and decisions. It provides an optimal policy strategy for 
maize marketing operations which gives us both the long term levels 
of policy decision variables and the optimal adjustment strategy to 
be pursued in order to achieve the stated goals. In this case, the 
model could be used to advise policy makers in which years to import 
or export maize and at what quantity levels. This strategy also 
involves building maize stock reserves at home, adjusted for size 
2only the optimization part le simulated. 
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every other year. It also defines the optimal maize stock levels to 
aim for in each year. 
The objective function being minimized is the sum of the net 
maize marketing operations costs incurred throughout the 16 year 
period under study. The objective function is minimized subject to 
the constraint structure imposed by the policy makers. The model can 
easily be altered to reflect changes in policy concerns as may be 
reflected from year to year. 
The cost concept utilized in this study is quite different from 
that employed in many mathematical models done on the marketing 
system in Zambia. The cost concept here, denoted by Ct ' is defined 
as the sum of three basic costs and three marketing costs (15) . The 
net cost is derived by deducting sales revenue accruing from the sale 
of maize to millers and industrial processors. The three basic costs 
are: 
1. the value of all the maize procured, i . e., the producer price of 
maize multiplied by the quantity of maize procured: 
2. the value of all the imported maize, i.e., the import price of 
maize multiplied by the quantity of maize imported: 
3. total storage costs, i.e., per unit storage cost multiplied by 
the quantity of maize in storage: O.SPst(OSt + CSt) 
The three marketing costs are : 
1. the cost of procuring maize: aPptPRt 
2. the cost of distributing both domestic and imported maize: 
/3PptSLt 
3 . the cost of clearing imports at the port of entry: 0PptIMt 
This annual cost concept is similar to the one used by Krishna and 
Chhibber. The cost function is specified as follows: 
( 1) 
where: 
ppt is 
PRt is 
Pit is 
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[PptPRt + P itIMt + O.SP 8 t(OSt + CSt) + 
[aPptPRt + ~pptSLt + 0PptIMt) - PSLtSLt 
t = 1985, 1986 , .•• • , 2000 
the producer price of maize faced by farmers 
the quantity of mai ze marketed in year t . 
the price of imported maize in year t. 
in year t. 
I Mt is the quantity of imports brought into the country in year 
Pet is the cost of storing maize in year t. 
ost is the level of maize opening stocks held by the marketing 
agents in a given year t. 
est is the level of maize closing stocks held by the market i ng 
agents in year t. 
aPpt is the proportion of the producer price relating to the 
costs incurred in procuring maize in year t. 
SLt is the quantity of maize allocated to millers and industrial 
processors in year t . 
~Ppt is the proportion of the producer price reflecting the 
average costs incurred in distributing both imported and 
domestic maize in year t. 
t. 
eppt is the proportion of the producer price reflecting the costs 
incurred in clearing imported maize in year t . 
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Pslt is the price of maize offered to millers and industrial 
processors in year t. 
After consolidating all the terms in the annual cost function, 
ct becomes 
ct = (l+a)PptPRt + (Pit + 0Ppt)IMt + 0.5Pst(OSt + CSt) 
- (Pslt - ~ppt)SLt 
The present value of this annual cost over the 16 year period under 
review is: 
(2) L Ct/(l+r)t-1985 
t 
t = 1985, 1986, • • • • t 2000 
2000 
L [(l+a)P tPRt]/[(l+r)t-l995 ] + [(Pit+0P t)IMt) / 
t=1985 p p 
[(l+r)t-1985) + [0.5Pst(OSt+CSt))/(l+r)t-1985] -
where r, the discount rate, is assumed to be 15%. The dynamic 
optimization model to be minimized is the present value of the annual 
cost of maize marketing operations: The complete model specification 
is as follows: 
Minimize L ct/(l+r)t-1985 
t 
Minimize 
t = 1985, 1986, • • • • t 2000 
( 3) 
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subject to the following policy constraints: 
PRt ~ PRt ( 3 . 1) 
ost ~ ¢SLt ( 3. 2) 
est PRt + !Mt + ost - SLt ( 3. 3) 
SLt = SLt ( 3. 4) 
I Mt ~ 0 or I Mt :s I Mt ( 3. 5) 
ost + 1 est 
( 3. 6) 
PRt' ost, est, SLt' ~ 0 for all t . ( 3. 7) 
The constraints are specified in order to reflect the concerns of the 
policy makers. Decisions over the entire sixteen year period are 
made regarding the interactio n of the five basic variables under 
gover nment control. The decisions to be made relate to questions of 
what quantities of maize t o procure, import or export, or have in 
stock at the end or at the beginning of each crop year. Decisions 
also have to be made r egarding the levels of maize sales to be made 
to millers and industrial processors over the seventeen year period . 
However , the marketing operations cost as defined above is 
bound not to be substantially reduced if the variation of the five 
variables by policy makers is done nonoptimally . In Zambia, govern-
ment policy with regard to maize purchases guarantees the buying of 
all the maize offered for sale by farmers. The producer price of 
maize is kept constant throughout the crop season and NAMBOARD is the 
government appointed agent with specific obligations as the buyer and 
seller of last resort . Over the years, marketed maize has 
constituted an average of about 70\ of estimated total maize 
3S 
production. Therefore, maize procurements in the programming problem 
are not allowed to be less than 70\ of estimated total maize produc-
tion in each year. Opening maize stock levels at the beginning of 
May in each year are set at not less than 2S\ of the total 
maize sales to millers and the industrial processors. The official 
stated goal of the government is to maintain about 2.S million 90 kg 
bags of maize as reserve stocks at any given time of the year. 
In alternative model simulations, maize opening stock levels 
are set at a minimum of SO\ of total sales to millers and industrial 
processors in each year . Sales to millers and industrial processors 
reduce the cost of maize marketing operations by increasing the maize 
sales revenue deducted from total cost. However, maize sales to 
millers and industrial processors are fixed each year in accordance 
with the government maize allocations which are determined on the 
basis of maize availabil ity and the amount of maize demanded for 
consumption. This refers to market demand of maize for mealie-meal 
as well as for industrial processing uses. Increases in maize sales 
are supported by increases in maize procurements, opening maize stock 
levels and imports in the event of a shortfall in domestic maize 
supplies. 
The maize opening stock level of minimum SO\ of total maize 
sales as stipul ated above ensures a greater measure of food security 
for the country, especially in the face of shortfalls in 
domestic maize supplies and the current critical shortage of foreign 
exchange needed to bring in imports expediently. 
Thus imports are brought in on a very limited level only to 
fill the shortfall in domestic maize supplies for sale as well as to 
help maintain the 2S or SO\ minimum levels set for maize opening 
stocks. In times of domestic maize surpluses, exports are 
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allowed in the model after satisfying requirements for maize sales as 
well as for maintaining the stipulated minimum maize opening stock 
levels in each year . 
The underlined quantities, PRt' SLt and IMt are constants 
reflect ing the projected minimum, equality or maximum levels the 
policy variables are allowed to reach. 
The Data Set for the Model 
The initial aim of this research study was to develop two 
models . An econometric model was to be constructed to provide the 
quantity levels to which the policy decision variables in the dynamic 
optimization model were to be constrained. However, the difficulties 
encountered in obtaining enough data ruled out the possibility of 
building an appropriate econometric model. Therefore, alternative 
methods were used to obtain the model coefficients. Projected values 
of total maize purchases and maize sales from the World Bank 
Report (28) were used. These range from 1985 to the year 2000. 
Maize producer prices variations are administered by the government 
through annual adjustments that take into account the impacts on the 
farmers' welfare as well as the welfare of the consumer. During the 
1980s, substantial increases in maize producer prices have been made. 
However , in view of government commitment to work towards reducing 
subsidies i n the maize consumer market and their ultimate removal 
over the year, maizs producer prices in the model are assumed to grow 
at a rate of 5% annually from 1988 through the year 2000. Marketing 
costs average out to about 40% of the producer price of maize. Of 
this cost, 21% of the maize producer price is spent on transportation 
(28) . This is assumed to be the same proportion of the producer 
price that is used through the year 2000. This transportation cost 
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covers the cost of distributing both imported and domestic maize. 
Total storage costs work out to about 43% of maize producer price 
(28). In this study, this situation is assumed to continue through 
the year 2000 by projecting storage costs as a fixed proportion (at 
43%) of the maize procurement price in any given year (t). One-half 
of this cost constitutes the average carrying cost for opening and 
closing maize stocks, respectively. 
Maize import prices grow at a rate of 3.5% per annum. The 
costs incurred in clearing maize imports at the ports of entry are 
assumed fixed at the 6% of maize procurement price level. 
In the drought scenario and the drought and foreign exchange 
shortage scenario, droughts are assumed to occur in six of the 
sixteen projection years. The droughts occur in the years 1987, 
1988, 1993, 1994, 1996 and 1998. The droughts are reflected by the 
inability of maize procurements to satisfy the required minimum maize 
sales in the assumed drought years. 
The foreign exchange shortage situations affect the maize 
sector only in so far as they restrict the capacity to import. This 
reduces maize imports to between 80 and 90% of imports in situations 
with no foreign exchange restrictions. 
Assumptions underlying the programming problem 
Implicit assumptions have been made about the nature of the 
maize marketing operations and the decision variables as outlined in 
the mathematical formulation above. 
1. Optimization: It is assumed that the present value of the net 
annual cost of maize marketing operations is minimized over the 
entire projection period. 
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2. Determinism: It is assumed that the coefficients in the objec-
tive function and in the constraint structure are all known 
constants. 
3. Continuity: It is assumed that noninteger values, i . e., frac-
tional units, can be used to reflect the levels of the government 
decision variables undertaken and the amount of resources 
utilized in carrying out maize marketing operations. 
4 . Finiteness: The government decision variables in maize marketing 
operations and the constraints imposed upon them are assumed to 
be finite in number. This makes it possible to arrive at a 
solution to the programming problem. 
5. Proportionality: The gross margin and resource requirements per 
unit of government decision variable are assumed to be constant 
regardless of the level of the decision variable reached. A 
constant gross margin per unit of activity assumes a perfectly 
elastic demand curve for maize. Suppl ies of any variable inputs 
that may be used are also assumed to be perfectly elastic. 
Constant resource requirements per unit of activity are equiva-
lent to a leontief production function, i.e., a linear ray 
through the origin (10). 
6 . Fixedness: It is assumed that at least one constraint has a 
right hand size whose coefficient is nonzero in value. 
7. Additivity : Given the five policy decision variables specified 
in the model, their total product is the sum of the separate 
variable products. In other words, there are no interaction 
effects among the policy decision variables. 
8. Homogeneity: Units of the same policy decision variable are 
assumed to be identical. 
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Condit ions f or optima l ity 
The programming model specification (3) subject to policy 
concerns (3.l) to (3.7) has an optimal solution equivalent to one 
that would be derived from a Lagrangean function which has no 
constraints . The Lagrangean function fo r the maize marketing opera-
tions optimization problem is: 
L ( 4) 
where the variables, µlt' µ 2t, µ3t, µ 4t' µSt ' and µGt' are called 
Lagrangean multipliers. Their economic interpretation will be 
touched on below when the necessary conditions for an optimal 
solution to this problem to occur are outlined. 
A numerical solution t o this problem can be derived by using 
classical calculus. This requires taking partial derivatives of the 
stated Lagrangean function with respect to the specified policy 
variables which in this case are PRt' ost' est , SLt' and ™t' as well 
as with respec t to the Lagrangean multipliers µlt' µ 2t' µ3t' µ 4t' 
µSt ' and µ 6t. These partial derivatives are then set equal to zero. 
The resulting system of equations would be as follows: 
( 4 . 1) 
0 ( 4 . 2) 
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TJL/T]eSt [O.SPstf(l+r)t- 198Sl - µ3t + µ6t = 0 ( 4. 3) 
TJL/TJSLt - [(Pslt - ~Ppt)/(l+r)t-198Sl - µ3t + µ4t 0 ( 4. 4) 
TJL/TJIMt [ (Pit + SP )/(l+r)t-198Sl pt + µ3t - µSt 
0 ( 4. s) 
TJL/TJµlt = PRt - PRt = 0 (4.6) 
TJL/T]µ2t ¢SLt - ost 0 ( 4. 7) 
TJL/T]µ3t = -est - SLt + PRt + IMt - ost 0 (4.8) 
T/L/T]µ4t SLt - SLt 0 ( 4. 9) 
T/L/TJµst !Mt - !Mt = 0 (4.10) 
TJL / T]µ6t est - ost+l 0 (4.11) 
The solutions in the variables PRt' ost, est, SLt' !Mt ' µlt' µ2t' 
µ3t' µ 4 t ' µSt and µ 6t are derived by simultaneo usly solving the 
eleven linear equations (4 . 1) to (4 . 11). This procedure helps to 
reduce the minimization problem to a problem of simultaneous 
equations. For a unique solution to occur in this minimizatio n 
problem, the number of constraints should equal the number o f 
variables . At optimality, the variables µlt ' µ 2t' µ 3t' µ 4t' µSt and 
µ 6t are the shadow prices associated with the resource constraints. 
As stated earlier on, the classical optimizat i on technique 
outlined above assumes equality constr aints. However, the optimiza-
tion model used in this study incorporates the use of inequality 
constraints as well . We, therefore, use the Kuhn-Tucker optimization 
techniques which generalize the Lagrangean method to include problems 
with inequality constraints . For the prograrruning problem used in 
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this study to have an optimal solution, the following Kuhn- Tucker 
conditions must be satisfied. 
T]L/T]µ3t 
[(l+a)P /(l+r)t-1985) -
pt 
- [(Pslt - ~ppt)/(l+r)t-19851 - µ3t + µ4t ~ 0 
[(Pit + eppt) / (l+r)t-1985] + µ3t - µSt ~ o 
17L/17µ6t = est - ost+l ~ o 
and the complementary slackness conditions are: 
[[(l+a)Ppt/(l+r)t- l 995 l - µlt + µJtl PRt = (T]L/T]PRt)PRt = 0 
[[0.SPst/(l+r)t-1985) - µ2t + µ3tl ost 0 
(4 . 12) 
(4.13) 
(4.14) 
(4 . 15) 
(4.16 ) 
(4.17) 
( 4 . 18) 
(4.19) 
(4.20) 
(4 . 21) 
(4.22) 
(4.23) 
(4.24) 
(4 . 25) 
[[-(Pslt - ~ppt)/(l~r)t-1985) - µ3t + µ4tl SLt = (T]L/T]SLt)SLt=O (4.26) 
( [(Pit+ 0Ppt)/(l+r)t-l
995
1 + µ3t - µstl IMt = (T]L/T] I Mt)IMt = 0 (4.27) 
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(PRt - PRt) µlt = (TJL/7Jµlt) µlt 0 (4.28) 
(</JSLt - OSt) µ2t = (TJL/T]µ2t) µ2t = 0 (4.29) 
(-est - sLt + PRt + IMt - OSt) µ3t = (TJL/T]µ3t) µ3t 0 (4 .30) 
(SLt - SLt) µ4t (TJL/TJµ4t) µ4t = 0 (4.31) 
(IMt - IMt) µSt = (TJL/TJµst> µSt = 0 (4.32) 
(CSt - ost+1> µ6t = (TJL/T]µ6t) µ6t 0 (4.33) 
The economic interpretation of the optimality conditions 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions expressed in the equation system 
(4.12) to (~.33) cannot be used to solve for the policy decision 
variables, and the µit's using simultaneous equation techniques. The 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions do not provide an analytical procedure for 
deriving the optimal solution, but they do, however, establish the 
conditions that the policy decision variables must satisfy if they 
are to be identified as the optimal solution (10). 
In optimality, the µit's are imputed values for the decision 
variable constraints, better known as the opportunity costs or shadow 
prices. Conditions (4.12) and (4.23) state that when a positive 
amount of maize is procured, in year t, then the total present value 
per unit cost of procured maize must equal the net imputed value of 
the procured maize. Similarly, conditions (4.13) and (4.24) state 
that the present value unit average cost of storing maize by the 
beginning of the crop year should equal the net imputed value of the 
stored maize in year t. This condition holds when a positive amount 
of maize is stored by the beginning of the crop year. The same 
interpretation is made with regard to conditions (4.14) to (4.16) in 
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association with conditions (4.25) to (4.27). When we have positive 
amounts of maize stocks by the end of a crop year and also positive 
amounts of imports in any given year t, then the present value average 
unit cost of storing maize by the end of the crop season and the 
present value of the total cost of bringing in a unit of imported 
maize must equal their respective net imputed values. Conditions 
(4.15) and (4.26) state that for positive amounts of maize sales to 
millers and industrial processors, the net present value of a unit 
maize sale must equal the net imputed value of the maize sale. 
Conditions (4.17) to (4.22) and (4.28) to (4.33) indicate the 
availability levels of the maize policy variables. Conditions (4.17) 
and (4.28) indicate that in any given year t, maize procurements will 
equal the projected minimum when the gross imputed value for the 
procured maize is positive. Conditions (4.18) and (4.29) indicate 
that when the imputed value of maize stored by the beginning of the 
crop year (t) is positive, then opening stock levels of maize in that 
year must equal the proportion of maize sales reflecting food security 
measures as required by policy makers . However, when the imputed 
value is zero, then opening maize stock levels can either be equal to 
the required proportion of maize sales as set by policy makers or they 
could be higher than the set proportion. 
Conditions (4.19) and (4.30) state that when the imputed value of 
maize stored by the end of the crop year (t) is positive, then closing 
stock levels must equal the sum of maize procurements, imports or 
exports (i.e., -IMt)' and opening stock levels in that year less the 
amount of maize sold to millers and industrial processors . Similarly , 
conditions (4.20) and (4.31) indicate that when the imputed value of 
maize sales in a given year t is positive, then maize sales must be at 
the level allocated by policy makers. Conditions (4.21) and (4.32) 
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indicate that for positive imputed values of exported/imported maize 
in a given year (t), the quantities exported/imported equal the levels 
set by policy makers in that particular year . The last two conditions 
(4.22) and (4.33) indicate that closing stock levels, in a given year 
t, must equa l the open ing stock levels in the following year when the 
imputed value, associated with constraining closing stocks in year t 
to the level of opening stocks in the following year, is positive. 
45 
CHAPTER IV. PROGRAMMING RESULTS 
Analysis of Results 
Before looking at the programming results, it is worth noting 
that during the entire sixteen year projection period, it is assumed 
that the government will continue to provide maize subsidies to 
consumers. This is reflected by the fact that maize procurement and 
import prices, in the programming model, are greater than the prices 
faced by millers and industrial processors. This means that the 
government marketing agents purchase a 90 kg bag of maize from a 
farmer at, for instance, K55 (in 1985) and sell it to the processors 
at K35, making a deficit of K20 per 90 kilogram bag. This deficit, 
however, is exclusive of other costs incurred during the procurement 
and distribution processes. 
In the programming model, optimal government decision variables 
that minimize the cost of maize marketing operations are derived 
within the general context that takes into account specific 
constraints with regard to maize stock policies as well as maize 
trade policies. Government policy on maize procurements requires 
that every bag of maize offered for sale by farmers be bought at the 
government set price . Therefore, government flexibility on maize 
procurement decisions are very limited to seeing to it that all maize 
offered for sale by farmers is bought. On the other hand, the 
government has an obligation to ensure that at least minimum maize 
consumption levels are attained for the Zambian consumers. The 
government, therefore, can only vary the upper limit levels of 
quantities of maize to be made available for sale to millers and 
other industrial processors. 
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Cost saving adjustments in maize marketing operations are made 
mainly through changes in inventory and trade policies. The Zambian 
maize system has generally tended to be self-sufficient in maize 
production during years of good rains. This situation is postulated 
in the basic scenario where good rains are assumed throughout the 
projection period. No maize imports are made in this scenario and 
when exports are permitted, substantial reductions in the present 
value of the cost are achieved. The cost is reduced from K17 . 61 
billion when no exports are allowed to KS.OS billion when exports are 
permitted in the basic scenario. The savings are mainly made through 
exports and the lower carryover stocks. No imports are made because 
of Zambia's self-sufficiency in maize production during normal 
rainfall situations . In fact, the self-sufficiency scenario, when 
minimum opening maize stocks are set at one-fourth of maize sales, 
renders this cost minimization approach to be of very limited value 
since all the government decision variables tend to come out at 
either their specified minimum or maximum levels. 
However, the validity of this cost minimization approach for 
maize marketing operations in Zambia is much better observed in the 
scenarios that incorporate the two major external shocks, drought and 
foreign exchange shortages, that adversely affect maize marketing 
operations in Zambia . Nevertheless, foreign exchange shortfalls 
alone do not increase the cost of maize market i ng operations when 
there is adequate rainfall throughout the entire projection period. 
This is because of the fact that no maize i mports are allowed in 
throughout this entire self-sufficiency projection period . The cost 
of maize marketing operations when there is normal rainfall 
throughout is KS.OS billion when exports are permitted and opening 
stock levels are set to be at least one-fourth of the targeted maize 
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sales. Banning exports in this situation would raise the operation 
costs to K17.60 billion in response to the enormous maize stock 
levels. In view of the limited adequate storage facilities in 
Zambia, such a situation would result in heavy maize losses due to 
lack of storage space. The cost penalties associated with banning 
exports are substantially high as reflected in the shadow prices for 
the excluded exports which range from K4,682.28 per metric tonne in 
1985 to K346.33 per metric tonne in the year 2000. As expected, the 
shadow prices for all the other maize operation activities are zero 
since they are all allowed to be part of the solution and assume 
nonzero quantity levels. 
On the other hand, the shadow prices associated with 
constraining the government decision variables suggest that relaxing 
the restriction on maize procurements would provide the biggest 
savings in the maize system over the projection period when self-
sufficiency is accompanied by exports restrictions. This kind of ban 
on exports would not only be an irrational policy, it is also very 
unlikely to be pursued by the policy makers because the alternative 
policy of permitting exports not only reduces the present value cost 
of maize operations considerably by about 71%, it also satisfies the 
goals of food security minimum sto ck levels and at the same time 
accommodates increases in maize consumption. 
In the scenario where there is a foreign exchange shortage but 
with normal rainfall throughout, the importance of permitting exports 
is as much a cost reduction concern as it is a great contributor 
towards foreign exchange replenishing, although the present v alues of 
the cost of maize marketing operations remain the same when compared 
to the normal rainfall scenario. 
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When drought occurs in six of the sixteen projection years and 
the foreign exchange situation is stable, the present value of the 
cost of maize marketing operations increases by about Kl30 million, 
i.e. from KS.OS billion to KS.18 billion when compared to the present 
value of the cost in the basic (normal rainfall) scenario with 
exports allowed. The increased cost is as a result of lost revenue 
from reduced exports in addition to the government's stringent 
measures to bring in imports in some of the drought years. Maize 
stock levels are also increased as a good security measure as well as 
a cushion against the high cost of importing maize during the years 
when there are maize supply shortfalls. The increased maize stock 
levels also contribute to the increased present value cost of maize 
operations. 
The shadow prices associated with the constraints seem to 
suggest that marginally relaxing the constraint on maize sales would 
provide the biggest savings followed by relaxation of the minimum 
constraint on maize purchases in the initial stages of the 
projections. Over the years, the revenue loss from restricting 
exports takes on more prominence in raising the cost followed by 
costs incurred in maintaining maize stock levels at increased 
magnitudes. This situation may seem to suggest a more liberal policy 
on maize exports in the long run which in turn would require the 
maintenance of only moderate levels of maize stock in the long run. 
With exports still permitted, the combination of drought and 
unstable foreign exchange levels would further increase the present 
value cost of maize marketing operations to KS.21 billion, an 
increase of K30 million over the drought scenario present value cost 
of maize operations. In the drought and foreign exchange scenario, 
maize imports and exports are further restricted while maize stocks 
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are increased slightly in the middle term of the projection period . 
The combined effect of export revenue losses, as a result of reduced 
exports, and the increased cost of maintaining more maize stocks, 
override the savings made from reduced maize imports. 
In all four scenarios, the banning of maize exports with minimum 
opening stocks at one-fourth of maize sales, drastically increases 
the present value coat of maize marketing operations. In the basic 
scenario, the cost increases from KS . OS billion when exports are 
permitted to Kl7.61 when exports are eliminated. Exact cost levels 
and changes are observ ed when a f o reign exchange shortage situation 
arises while rainfall is assumed normal for the whole pro jection 
period. 
In the drought scenario, the present value cost increases from 
KS . 18 billio n when exports are allowed to Kl0.44 billion when exports 
are not part of maize marketing o perations. When there i s a 
combination of drought and foreign exchange shortage, the present 
value cost i ncreases from KS.21 billion, with exports, to Kl0 . 44 
bi l lion without exports. In all these situations, the present value 
cost more than doubles when exports are banned. 
Introduction of a greater measure of food security by setting 
minimum opening stocks at o ne-half of maize sales increases the 
present value of the cost of maize marketing operations. When 
comparisons are made for the two different levels of food security 
(i.e . , 25% and 50% minimum stocks), with exports allowed, the 
increase in cost in the SO% minimum stocks scenario results from 
reduced exports and increased maize stock levels . 
In the basic scenario, increasing minimum opening stock levels 
from 2S% of maize sales to 50% increases present value 
cost by about 1S%, from KS.OS b il lion to KS.82 b i llion . In the first 
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three years, opening stocks are in slack. As a result, the dual 
prices for opening stock levels for those three years are zero. This 
suggests that increasing the level of the minimum constraint on 
opening stock levels by the magnitude of the slack stock level would 
not increase the present value of the cost of maize marketing 
operations. Therefore , the government has more flexibility in the 
short term to maintain more than the minimum required opening maize 
stock levels. Exports on the other hand are not in slack during the 
first three years of the projection period and their imputed values 
indicate that further constraining exports on a marginal level would 
in fact increase the present value cost. 
However, the middle and long term policy strategies seem to 
point in the direction of more stringent inventory controls and a 
more flexible export policy. Opening stock levels are no longer in 
slack and their shadow prices indicate that marginally relaxing the 
constraint on opening stock levels would in fact reduce the present 
value cost of marketing operations . For instance, in 1990 , the 
shadow price associated with constraining opening stock levels to a 
minimum 25% of maize sales is K393.58. The marginal unit used in the 
programming model is one metric ton, therefore reducing the minimum 
constraint on opening stock levels by one metric ton in 1990 would 
reduce the present value cost of marketing operations by K393.58. 
On the other hand, the long term cost penalties for restraining 
exports are reduced to zero as less is exported and exports actually 
get slack levels. In the short term (1985-1988) before exports 
exhibit some slack, their positive dual prices indicate that savings 
are possible with marginal relaxation of the restrictions on maize 
exports. However, in the long run this is no longer so as the 
contribution of exports to cost saving is reduced. Relaxing the 
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maximum restraints on maize exports by the magnitude of their slack 
levels would actually not affect the amount spent on marketing 
operations. The maize opening stock levels fall to their minimum 
levels and the government would have more flexibility on maize export 
policy . 
The basic and foreign exchange shortage scenarios, with exports 
allowed, follow the same kind of analysis dealt with above. Present 
value cost increases from KS.OS billion, with minimum opening stock 
levels 2S% of maize sales, to KS.82 when opening stock levels are 
raised to minimum SO% of maize sales. However , holding opening stock 
levels at minimum SO% of maize sales in a drought scenario increases 
the present value cost of marketing operations by K20 million, from 
KS.82 in basic scenario to KS.84 in the drought scenario, an increase 
of 0.3%. Even though fewer maize procurements in the drought 
scenario have the effect of lowering the present value cost of maize 
marketing operations, this effect is offset by the loss in export 
revenues and also by the slight increase in the amount of opening 
stock levels held in the short term. Not o nly are exports 
drastically reduced, some imports are brought in during four of the 
six drought years. In the short term and middle term, the maize 
trade (export-import) strategy followed in the drought scenario and 
SO% minimum opening stock levels is the same as that pursued when 
maize opening stock levels are set at a minimum 2S% of maize sales in 
a drought scenario . However, with a greater measure of food 
security, i.e., with SO% minimum opening stock levels, fewer exports 
and more imports are utilized in the long run than are used with 2S% 
minimum opening stock levels under the same drought conditions. 
When the drought scenario is beset with a foreign exchange 
situation, the present value cost of maize marketing operations, with 
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50% minimum opening stock levels, increases from KS.84 to KS . 9 
billion, an increase of K60 million over the projection period . The 
cost increases in response to some export revenue losses and the 
added cost of maintaining the slight increase in maize stock levels 
in the long run . 
The banning of exports, when maize opening stock levels are held 
at a minimum of 50\ of maize sales, more than triples the present 
value cost of maize marketing operations in the basic scenario. From 
the cost of KS.82 billion when exports are allowed, the present value 
cost increases to Kl8.12 billion. In the drought scenario the 
increase in cost is slightly moderate in comparison. The present 
value cost of marketing operations increases from KS.84 billion in 
Table 27 to Kl0.96 billion in Table 31, an increase of 87.7% as 
opposed to the 211.3\ increase in cost in the basic scenario . 
Another thing to note is that when exports are not permitted 
under all four scenarios, the present value cost of maize marketing 
operations is greater under the requirement of 50\ of maize sales 
minimum maize opening stocks than it is under the 25\ requirement 
condition. The differences in cost only reflect the degree of 
flexibility in inventory control under the two conditions. The 
greater the food security measure taken, the more rigid inventory 
control is and the greater the present value of maize marketing 
operations costs . 
Table 17. Maize model programming projections (1985-2000) with exports allowed and minimum 
opening stocks one-fourth of maize sales 
Scenario/ Procurements Imports Opening Stocks Closing Stocks Sales Present Value of Cost 
Year (PR) (IM) (OS) (CS) (SL) 
Metric Tons Billion Kwacha 
Basic 
1985 636267 -59664 142447.5 149260.5 569790 5 . 05 
1986 954401 -350546 149260.5 156073.5 597042 
1987 992577 -361470 156073 . 5 162886 . 5 651546 
1988 1032280 -373921 162886.5 169699 . 5 651546 
1989 1073571 -387960 169699.5 176512.5 678787 
1990 1116514 -401774 . 5 176512.5 185202 706050 
1991 1161175 -411677. 5 185202 193891.5 740808 
1992 1207622 -423366 . 5 193891.5 202581 775566 I/I w 
1993 1255927 -436913.5 202581 211270 . 5 810324 
1994 1306164 -452392 . 5 211270. 5 219960 845082 
1995 1358410 -467581 219960 230949 879840 
1996 1412747 -477962 230949 241938 923796 
1997 1469256 -490515 241938 252927 967752 
1998 1528027 -505330 252927 263916 1011708 
1999 1589148 -522495 263916 274905 1055664 
2000 1652714 -542105 274905 285894 1099620 
Table 18. Maize model programming projections (1985-2000} with exports allowed and minimum 
opening stocks one-fourth of maize sales 
Scenario/ Procurements Imports Opening Stocks Closing Stocks Sales Present Value of Cost 
Year (PR} (IM} (OS) (CS) (SL) 
Metric Tons Billion Kwacha 
Basic and 
Exchange 
Shortage 
1985 636267 -59664 142447.5 149260.5 569790 5.05 
1986 954401 -350546 149260.5 156073.5 597042 
1987 992577 -361470 156073.5 162886.5 651546 
1988 1032280 - 373921 162886.5 169699.5 651546 
1989 1073571 - 387960 169699.5 176512.5 678787 
1990 1116514 -401774. 5 176512.5 185202 706050 U1 
1991 1161175 -411677 . 5 185202 193891.5 740808 ~ 
1992 1207622 - 423366.5 193891. 5 202581 775566 
1993 1255927 -436913.5 202581 211270.5 810324 
1994 1306164 -452392.5 211270.5 219960 845082 
1995 1358410 -467581 219960 230949 879840 
1996 1412747 -477962 230949 241938 923796 
1997 1469256 -490515 241938 252927 967752 
1998 1528027 -505330 252927 263916 1011708 
1999 1589148 -522495 263916 274905 1055664 
2000 1652714 - 542105 274905 285894 1099620 
Table 19 . Maize model programming projections (1985-2000) with exports allowed and minimum 
opening stocks one-fourth of maize sales 
Scenario/ 
Year 
Drought 
1985 
1986 
1987a 
1988a 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993a 
1994a 
1995 
1996a 
1997 
1998a 
1999 
2000 
Procurements 
(PR) 
I mports 
(IM) 
636267 0 
954667 -331571 
57 2641 0 
637920 0 
1050124 - 357710 
1071136 -347707 
1092139 -333952 
1135825 -342880 
753556 32576 
783698 70073 .5 
1181258 -290429 
815046 119739 
1228508 - 249767 
847648 175049 
1277649 - 210996 
1328755 - 218146 
Opening Stocks 
(OS) 
Metric Tons 
142447 . 5 
208924.S 
234978.5 
183325 .5 
169699.5 
183325 . 5 
200704 . 5 
218083.5 
235462 . 5 
211270 . 
219960 
230949 
241938 
252927 
263916 
274905 
Closing Stocks Sales Present Value of Cost 
(CS) (SL) 
Billion Kwacha 
208924 . 5 569790 5.18 
234978 . 5 597042 
183325 . 5 624294 
169699 . 5 651546 
183325 .5 678798 
200704.5 706050 
218083.5 740808 
235462 . 5 77 5566 
211270 . 5 810324 
219960 845082 
230949 879840 
241938 923796 
252927 967752 
263916 1011708 
274905 1055664 
285894 1099620 
a.?. drought is assumed to occur in these years. 
(J1 
(J1 
Table 20. Maize model programming projections (1985-2000) with expor ts allowed and minimum 
opening stocks one- fourth of maize sales 
Scenario/ 
Year 
Procurements 
(PR) 
Imports 
(IM) 
Drought and 
Exchange 
Shortage 
1985 636267 
1986 954667 
1987a 572641 
1988a 595546 
1989 1050134 
1990 1071136 
1991 1092139 
1992 1135825 
1993a 753556 
1994a 783698 
1995 1181258 
1996a 815041 
1997 1228508 
1998a 847648 
1999 1277649 
2000 1328755 
0 
-331571 
0 
42374 
-357710 
-347707 
- 333952 
-329111 . 2 
29318 . 4 
59562.3 
-278455.l 
107765 . l 
-214757 . 2 
140039.2 
-210996 
-218146 
Opening Stocks 
(OS) 
Metric Tons 
142447.5 
208924.5 
234978.5 
183325 . 5 
169699.5 
183325.5 
200704.5 
218083.5 
249231. 3 
221781.7 
219960 
242922.9 
241938 
287936.8 
263916 
274905 
Closing Stocks Sales Present Value of Cost 
(CS) (SL) 
Billion Kwacha 
208924.5 569790 5.21 
234978.5 597042 
183325 . 5 624294 
169699.5 651546 
183325.5 678798 
200704 . 5 706050 
218083 . 5 740808 
249231 . 3 775566 
221781. 7 810324 
219960 845082 
242922.9 879840 
241938 923796 
287936.8 967752 
263916 1011708 
274905 1055664 
285894 1099620 
aA drought is assumed to occur in thes e years. 
Table 21. Maize model programming projections (1985-2000) with no exports allowed and minimum 
opening stocks one-fourth of maize sales 
Scenario/ Procurements Imports Opening Stocks Closing Stocks Sales Present Value of Coat 
Year (PR) (IM) (OS) (CS) (SL) 
Metric Tons Billion Kwacha 
Basic 
1985 636267 0 142447.5 208924 .5 569790 17.61 
1986 954401 0 208924.5 566283.5 597042 
1987 992577 0 566283.5 934566.5 624294 
1988 1032280 0 934566.5 1315301 651546 
1989 1073571 0 1315301 1710074 678798 
1990 1116514 0 1710074 2120538 706050 
1991 1161175 0 2120538 2540905 740808 
1992 1207622 0 2540905 2972961 775566 U1 
1993 1255927 0 2972961 3418564 810324 ...J 
1994 1306164 0 3418564 3879646 845082 
1995 1358410 0 3879646 4358216 879840 
1996 1412747 0 4358216 4847167 923796 
1997 1469256 0 4847167 5348671 967752 
1998 1528027 0 5348671 5864990 1011708 
1999 1589148 0 5864990 6398474 1055664 
2000 1652714 0 6398474 6951568 1099620 
Table 22. Maize model programming projections (1985-2000 ) with no exports allowed and minimum 
opening stocks one-fourth of maize sales 
Scenario/ Procurements Imports Opening Stocks Closing Stocke Salee Present Value of Coat 
Year (PR) (IM) (OS) (CS) (SL) 
Metr ic Tona Bill ion Kwacha 
Basic and 
Exchange 
Shortage 
1985 636267 0 142447.5 208924.5 569790 17.61 
1986 95 4401 0 208924 . 5 566283.5 597042 
1987 992577 0 566283.5 934566.5 624294 
1988 1032280 0 934566.5 1315301 651546 
1989 1073571 0 1315301 1710074 678798 
1990 1116514 0 1710074 2120538 706050 U1 
1991 1161175 0 2120538 2540905 740808 CD 
1992 1207622 0 2540905 2972961 775566 
1993 1255927 0 2972961 3418564 810324 
1994 1306164 0 3418564 3879646 845082 
1995 1358410 0 3879646 4358216 879840 
1996 1412747 0 4358216 4847167 923796 
1997 1469256 0 4847167 5348671 967752 
1998 1528027 0 5348671 5864990 1011708 
1999 1589148 0 5864990 6398474 1055664 
2000 1652714 0 6398474 6951568 1099620 
Table 23 . Maize model programming projections (1985- 2000) with no expo rts allowed and minimum 
opening stocks one- fourth of maize sales 
Scenario/ Procurements Imports Opening Stocks Closing Stocks Sales Present Value of Cost 
Year (PR) (IM) (OS) (CS) (SL) 
Metric Tons Billion Kwacha 
Drought 
1985 636267 0 142447 . 5 208924.5 569790 10 .44 
1986 954667 0 208924 .5 566549 . 5 597042 
1987a 572641 0 566549.5 514896 . 5 624294 
1988a 595546 0 514896 . 5 458896.5 651546 
1989 1050134 0 458896.5 830232 . 5 678798 
1990 1071136 0 830232.5 1195319 706050 
1991 1092139 0 1195319 1546650 740808 
1992 1135825 0 1546650 1906909 775566 
1993a 753556 0 1906909 1850141 810324 
1994a 783698 0 1850141 1788757 845082 
1995 1181258 0 1788757 2090175 879840 
1996a 8 15046 0 2090175 1981425 923796 
1997 1228508 0 1981425 2242181 967752 
1998a 8 47648 0 2242 181 2078121 1011708 
1999 1277649 0 207812 1 2300106 1055664 
2000 1328755 0 2300106 25292 41 1099620 
a.A drought is assumed to occur in these years . 
1.11 
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Table 24. Maize model progranuning projections (1985- 2000) with no exports allowed and minimum 
opening stocks one-fourth of maize sales 
Scenario/ Procurements Imports Opening Stocks Closing Stocks Sales Present Value of Cost 
Year (PR) (IM) (OS) (CS) (SL) 
Metric Tons Billion Kwacha 
Drought and 
Exchange 
Shortage 
1985 636267 0 142447.5 208924.5 569790 10.44 
1986 954667 0 208924.5 566549.5 597042 
1987a 572641 0 566549.5 514896.5 624294 
1988a 595546 0 514896.5 458896 .5 651546 
1989 1050134 0 458896.5 830232.5 678798 
1990 1071136 0 830232.5 1195319 706050 
1991 1092139 0 1195319 1546650 740808 
1992 1135825 0 1546650 1906909 775566 
1993a 753556 0 1906909 1850141 81032 4 
1994a 783698 0 1850141 1788757 845082 
1995 1181258 0 1788757 2090175 879840 
1996a 815046 0 2090175 1981425 923796 
1997 1228508 0 1981425 2242181 967752 
1998a 847648 0 2242181 2078121 1011708 
1999 1277649 0 2078121 2300106 1055664 
2000 1328755 0 2300106 2529241 1099620 
aA drought is assumed to occur in these y ears . 
0\ 
0 
Table 25. Maize model programming projections (1985-2000) with exports allowed and minimum 
opening stocks one-half of maize sales 
Scenario/ Procurements Imports Opening Stocks Closing Stocks Sales Present Value of Cost 
Year (PR) (IM) (OS) (CS) (SL) 
Metric Tons Billion Kwacha 
Basic 
1985 636267 -59664 305334 312147 569790 5.82 
1986 954401 -350546 312147 318960 597042 
1987 992577 -361470 318960 325773 624294 
1988 1032280 -367108 325773 339399 651546 
1989 1073571 -381147 339399 353025 678798 
1990 1116514 -393085 353025 370404 706050 
1991 1161175 -402988 370404 387783 740808 
1992 1207622 -414677 387783 405162 775566 
1993 1255927 -428224 405162 422541 810324 °' I-' 
1994 1306164 -443703 422541 439920 845082 
1995 1358410 -456592 439920 461898 879840 
1996 1412747 -466973 461898 483876 923796 
1997 1469256 -479526 483876 505854 967752 
1998 1528027 -494341 505854 527832 1011708 
1999 1589148 -511506 527832 549810 1055664 
2000 165214 -542105 549810 560799 1099620 
Table 26. Maize model programming projections (1985-2000) with exports allowed and minimum 
opening stocks one-half of maize sales 
Scenario/ Procurements Imports Opening Stocks Closing Stocks Sales Present Value of Cost 
Year (PR ) (IM) (OS ) (CS) (SL) 
Metric Tons Bil l ion Kwacha 
Basic and 
Exchange 
Shortage 
1985 636267 -59664 305334 312147 569790 5 . 82 
1986 954401 -350546 312147 318960 597042 
1987 992577 -361470 318960 325773 624294 
1988 1032280 -367108 325773 339399 651546 
1989 1073571 -381147 339399 353025 678798 
1990 1116514 -393085 353025 370404 706050 
1991 1161175 -402988 370404 387783 740808 O'I 
"' 1992 1207622 - 414677 387783 405162 775566 
1993 1255927 -428224 405162 422541 810324 
1994 1306164 - 443703 422541 439920 845082 
1995 1358410 -456592 439920 461898 8 79840 
1996 1412747 -466973 461898 483876 923796 
1997 1469256 -479526 483876 505854 967752 
1998 1528027 - 494341 505854 527832 1011708 
1999 1589148 - 511506 527832 549810 1055664 
2000 165214 -542105 549810 560799 1099620 
Table 27. Maize model programming projections (1985-1000) with exports allowed and minimum 
opening stocks one- half of maize sales 
Scenario/ 
Year 
Drought 
1985 
1986 
1987a 
1988a 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993a 
1994a 
1995 
1996a 
1997 
1998a 
1999 
2000 
Procurements 
(PR) 
Imports 
(IM) 
636267 0 
954667 -331571 
572641 0 
595546 0 
1050134 - 357710 
1071136 -347707 
109 2 139 - 333952 
1135825 - 342880 
753556 74147 
783698 78763 
1181258 -279440 
815046 130728 
1228508 -238778 
847648 186038 
1277649 - 200007 
1328755 -493051 
Opening Stocks 
(OS) 
Metric Tons 
284895 
351372 
377426 
325773 
339399 
353025 
370404 
387783 
405162 
422541 
439920 
461898 
483876 
505854 
527832 
549810 
Closing Stocks Sales Present Value of Cost 
(CS) (SL) 
Billion Kwacha 
351372 569790 5.84 
377426 597042 
325773 624294 
339399 651546 
353025 678798 
370404 706050 
387783 740808 
405162 775566 
422541 810324 
439920 845082 
461898 879840 
483876 923796 
505854 967752 
527832 1011708 
549810 1055664 
285894 1099620 
aA d r ought is assumed to occur in these years. 
Table 28 . Maize mode l programming p ro jections (1985- 2000) with expor ts allowe d and minimum 
opening stocks one- half of maize sales 
Sce nario/ 
Year 
Procurements 
(PR) 
Impor ts 
(IM) 
Drought and 
Exchange 
Shortaoe 
1985 636267 
1986 954667 
1987a 572641 
1988a 595546 
1989 1050134 
1990 1071136 
1991 1092139 
1992 1135825 
1993a 753556 
1994 a 783698 
1995 1181258 
1996a 815046 
1997 1228508 
1998a 847648 
1999 1277649 
2000 1328755 
0 
- 331571 
0 
69626 
- 357710 
- 347707 
- 333952 
- 323650.8 
66732.3 
66948 . 55 
- 266367.2 
117655.2 
- 201570 . 4 
148830.4 
- 200007 
- 493051 
Opening Stocks 
(OS) 
Metric Tons 
284895 
351372 
377426 
325773 
339399 
353025 
370404 
387783 
424391. 2 
434355 . 4 
439920 
474970 . 8 
483876 
543061. 6 
527832 
549810 
Clos i ng Stocks Sales Present Value of Cost 
(CS) (SL) 
Billion Kwacha 
351372 569790 5 . 90 
377426 597042 
325773 624294 
339399 651546 
353025 678798 
370404 706050 
387783 740808 
424391.2 775566 
434355.4 810324 
439920 845082 
474970.8 879840 
483876 923796 
543061. 6 967752 
527832 1011708 
549810 1055664 
285894 1099620 
aA d r ought is assumed to occur in these years. 
Table 29. Maize model programming projections (1985-2000) with no exports allowed and minimum 
opening stocks one-half of maize sales 
scenario/ Procurements Imports Opening Stocks Closing Stocks Sales Present Value of Cost 
Year (PR) (IM) (OS) (CS) (SL) 
Metric Tons Billion Kwacha 
Basic 
1985 636267 0 284895 351372 569790 18.12 
1986 954401 0 351372 708731 597042 
1987 992577 0 708731 1077014 624294 
1988 1032280 0 1077014 1457748 651546 
1989 1073571 0 1457748 1852521 678798 
1990 1116514 0 1852521 2262985 706050 
1991 1161175 0 2262985 2683352 740808 
1992 1207622 0 2683352 3115408 775566 (J\ 
1993 1255927 0 3115408 3561011 810324 l11 
1994 1306164 0 3561011 4022093 845082 
1995 1358410 0 4022093 4500663 879840 
1996 1412747 0 4500663 4989614 923796 
1997 1469256 0 4989614 5491118 967752 
1998 1528027 0 5491118 6007437 1011708 
1999 1589148 0 6007437 6540921 1055664 
2000 1652714 0 6540921 7094015 1099620 
Table 30. Maize model programming projections (1985-2000) with no exports allowed and minimum 
opening stocks one-half of maize sales 
Scenario/ Procurements Imports Opening Stocks Closing Stocks Sales Present Value of Cost 
Year (PR) (IM) (OS) (CS) (SL) 
Metric Tons Billion Kwacha 
Basic and 
Exchange 
Shortage 
1985 636267 0 284895 351372 569790 18.12 
1986 954401 0 351372 708731 597042 
1987 992577 0 708731 1077014 624294 
1988 1032280 0 1077014 1457748 651546 
1989 1073571 0 1457748 1852521 678798 
1990 1116514 0 1852521 2262985 706050 
1991 1161175 0 2262985 2683352 740808 O'\ 
1992 1207622 0 2683352 3115408 775566 O'\ 
1993 1255927 0 3115408 3561011 810324 
1994 1306164 0 3561011 4022093 845082 
1995 1358410 0 4022093 4500663 879840 
1996 1412747 0 4500663 4989614 923796 
1997 1469256 0 4989614 5491118 967752 
1998 1528027 0 5491118 6007437 1011708 
1999 1589148 0 6007437 6540921 1055664 
2000 1652714 0 6540921 7094015 1099620 
Table 31. Maize model programming projections (1985-2000) with no exports allowed and minimum 
opening stocks one-half of maize sales 
Scenario/ 
Year 
Drought 
1985 
1986 
1987a 
1988a 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993a 
1994a 
1995 
1996a 
1997 
1998a 
1999 
2000 
art 
Procurements 
(PR) 
636267 
954667 
572641 
595546 
1050134 
1071136 
1092139 
1135825 
53556 
83698 
1181258 
815046 
1228508 
847648 
1277649 
1328755 
Imports 
(IM) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Opening Stocks 
(OS) 
Metric Tons 
284895 
351372 
708997 
657344 
601344 
972680 
1337766 
1689097 
2049356 
1992588 
1931204 
2232622 
2123872 
2384628 
2220568 
2442553 
Closing Stocks Sales Present Value of Cost 
(CS) (SL) 
Billion Kwacha 
351372 569790 10.96 
708997 597042 
657344 624294 
601344 651546 
972680 678798 
1337766 706050 
1689097 740808 
2049356 775566 
1992588 810324 
1931204 845082 
2232622 879840 
2123872 923796 
2384628 967752 
2220568 1011708 
2442553 1055664 
2671688 1099620 
i s assumed that a drought occurs in these years . 
Q'\ 
...... 
Table 32. Maize model programming projections (1985- 2000) with no exports allowed and minimum 
opening stocks one-half of maize sales 
Scenario/ 
Year 
Procurements 
(PR) 
Drought and 
Exchange 
Short ace 
1985 636267 
1986 954667 
1987a 572641 
1988a 595546 
1989 1050134 
1990 1071136 
1991 1092139 
1992 1135825 
1993a 753556 
1994a 783698 
1995 1181258 
1996a 815046 
1997 1228508 
1998a 847648 
1999 1277649 
2000 1328755 
Imports 
(IM) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Opening Stocks 
(OS) 
Metric Tons 
284895 
351372 
708997 
657344 
601344 
972680 
1337766 
1689097 
2049356 
1992588 
1931204 
2232622 
2123872 
2384628 
2220568 
2442553 
art is assumed that a drought occurs in these 
Closing Stocks Sales Present Value of Cost 
(CS) (SL) 
Billion Kwacha 
351372 569790 10.96 
708997 597042 
657344 624294 
601344 651546 
972680 678798 
1337766 706050 
1689097 740808 
2049356 775566 
1992588 810324 
1931204 845082 
2232622 879840 
2123872 923796 
2384628 967752 
2220568 1011708 
2442553 1055664 
2671688 1099620 
years . 
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Table 33. Summary table of the present value costs under the four 
scenarios 
25% OS 
Basic 
Basic + Forex 
Drought 
Drought + Forex 
50% OS 
Basic 
Basic + For ex 
Drought 
Drought + Forex 
Exports Allowed 
(in billion Kwacha) 
5.05 
5.05 
5.18 
5.21 
5.82 
5.82 
5.84 
5.90 
Exports Not Allowed 
(in bil l ion Kwacha) 
17 . 61 
17.61 
10.44 
10 . 44 
18.12 
18 . 12 
10.96 
10.96 
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CHAPTER V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Summary 
Managing an efficient distribution system o f food surpluses from 
farming communities to the nonfarming communities is a very important 
aspect of marketing operations. This is even more so in Zambia's 
context with a very high urban population that does not engage in 
direct food production. The government's role in the marketing 
system is that of ensuring that food supplies reach the consumers and 
that at least minimum food needs are satisfied even for the low 
income people. However, in managing such a distribution system, the 
government also tries to ensure that the system is r un at the minimum 
possible cost. These cost minimization concerns are of great 
importance to Zambia in view of the current problems that have beset 
the economy. 
Maize is by far the most important food crop grown in Zambia 
since it constitutes the staple food for over 95% of the population. 
Maize pricing and marketing have undergone a lot of review since the 
early times of colonialism. 
Currently, maize producer prices are set by the government based 
on perceived maize production costs with an allowance for farmers' 
profit margins. In marketing operations , major policy reforms have 
been instituted, the most drastic one being the liberalization of 
marketing operations in 1986. Under this system, private traders 
within each province were invited to participate in marketing 
operations alongside NAMBOARD and the Provincial Cooperative Unions. 
The Zambia maize sector tends to be self-sufficient when there 
is adequate rainfall and it is this heavy dependence on rainfed maize 
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that results in maize supply shortfalls whenever a drought occurs. 
The present limited capacity of the Zambian economy to generate 
foreign exchange directly affects Zambia's capacity to quickly 
replenish food supplies whenever there is a shortfall in maize 
supplies. 
The model used in the study is a dynamic optimization model 
where the p resent value of the cost of maize marketing operations is 
minimized over a sixteen year period. Four scenarios are u sed when 
making projections. In the basic scenario, it is assumed that there 
is adequate rainfall throughout the projection period . In the basic 
and foreign exchange scenario, rainfall is normal but a foreign 
exchange shortage situation is added. In the drought scenario, it is 
assumed that drought occurs in six of the sixteen projection years. 
In the drought and foreign exchange shortage scenario, foreign 
exchange limitations are coupled with drought problems besetting the 
maize sector. 
Over the years, the issue of food security has received 
increased importance in maize policy in Zambia. The model, 
therefore, simulates two different food security measures under the 
four scenarios. In the first set of simulations, maize opening 
stocks are required to be a minimum 25% of maize sales. The second 
set of simulations involve a greater measure of food security by 
increasing minimum opening stock levels to 50% of maize sales. All 
these simulations are done either with exports permitted or with 
exports banned. 
The results from the dynamic programming projections suggest 
that even with the current rigidities in maize procurements and 
sales, cost savings can be made through a rational blend of inventory 
and trade policies. Under the conditions used in the study, the 
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Zambian maize system is virtually self- sufficient. In the basic 
scenario and the basic and foreign exchange shortage scenario, the 
p r esent value cost of maize marketing operations is reduced from 
Kl7.61 billion, when exports are not permitted and minimum opening 
s tock level is 25% of maize sales, to K5.05 billion . In the drought 
scenario, the present value of the cost increases from KS.OS billion 
to K5.18 billion when exports are allowed . 
Increasing the minimum maize opening stock levels to 50% of 
maize sales increases the present value of the cost from K5.05 
billion in the basic scenario t o K5 . 82 billion. Similarly, the cost 
increases from K5 . 18 billion to KS.84 billion under drought 
conditions with exports allowed and from K5.21 billion to K5 . 90 
billion under the drought and foreign exchange shortage scenario with 
exports allowed. 
When exports are not permitted, the cost structure depends 
mainly on the level of minimum maize opening stocks decided on and 
also on whether there is a drought o r not. A greater level of 
minimum maize opening stocks increases inventory costs but drought 
has the effect of reducing procurement costs through the fewer maize 
purchases in the drought years . However, the imports brought in 
offset the cost reduct ions resulting from fewer procurements . 
The model developed in this study may not be directly used for 
policy advice in its current form. Great improvement to the analysis 
can be made by incorporating econometric analysis to look into the 
effects of environmental and policy factors that affect government 
decision variables in the maize sector and to also provide more 
refined data for use in the programming model . This was the initial 
direction of this study, but time constraints and the difficulty in 
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acquiring critical time series data in Zambia made it an impossible 
task to develop the econometric model part of the analysis. 
However, this does not mean that the model is not useful the way 
it is. It provides direction on how cost savings can be introduced 
in maize marketing operations through the blending of rational 
inventory and trade policies. It could also be used on a yearly 
basis to determine optimal policy variable quantities for each 
particular marketing year. 
Conclusion 
The maize marketing operations as modeled in this study reflect 
rigidities in the areas of maize procurement and sales despite the 
efforts made to liberalize the marketing system starting from 1986. 
This is in line with government policy to purchase all maize offered 
for sale by farmers and to sell only allocated maize quantities to 
millers and industrial processors. On the other hand, flexibility is 
exercised in inventory and trade strategies . 
However, the efforts of making maize marketing operations more 
cost effective will require socially profitable investments, 
opportunit ies for which significantly exist in Zambia's agricultural 
marketing system. Investments towards the development of rural 
infrastructure, especially communications and feeder roads for easy 
access to markets, should continue as priority activities in 
government plans. Even though Zambia's transport infrastructure is 
wel l developed by African standards, some rural areas still remain 
isolated and hard to reach and in most cases completely inaccessible 
in the rainy season when most rural roads become impassable. The 
current transport network situation better serves the urban areas and 
the import-export needs of the urban industrial sectors while leaving 
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rural areas relatively inaccessible. This situation adds to the high 
marketing costs. 
The movement towards greater food security would also require 
vast investments in storage facilities so as to provide even greater 
flexibility in inventory policy strategies. Proper and adequate 
storage facilities located in the right places can help to minimize 
storage losses and transport costs in the marketing process. 
The role of credit in facilitating the flow of maize from 
farmers to consumers is very important and deserves a lot of 
government attention in so far as provi ding adequate and more 
accessible credit to all participants in maize marketing operations 
is concerned . The credit system should be streamlined towards 
providing more and adequate credi t to all part i cipants i n maize 
marketing operations. The system should also be tailored towards 
maintaining equitable credit cost and access for all marketing 
agents. This is particularly important for private traders if they 
are to compete effectively in the maize marketing system, especially 
in view of the current conditions of maize subsid y payments. 
The present financial institution setup seems adequate in 
meeting the credit requirements in the marketing system. However, 
since private participation in maize marketing was only introduced in 
1986, private banks have not been very willing to lend money to 
private traders in the absence of credit ratings for these traders by 
the bankers. To minimize risks, the private banks will have to 
establish certain standards of risk for these traders before they 
provide credit allowances to them. In the meantime, the government 
could step in to fill the shortage of credit for licensed private 
traders by giving them more access to credit from the government 
financial institutions . 
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However, redressing issues of maize marketing inefficiencies 
will inevitably require government reforms in the pricing system. 
The current uniform pricing system for all regions may arguably 
result in inefficient allocation of resources since regional 
comparative advantages in maize production are not taken into 
consideration. The result may be a situation where maize is grown 
everywhere in the country at the expense of more agronomically and 
economically suited crops for those regions. Marketing efforts to 
collect all maize from all over the country would just compound the 
problem of high transportation costs faced at the moment. 
It has been argued that a regionally differentiated pricing 
system, based on differences in transportation, marketing and 
production costs in general, for each region would encourage farmers 
to allocate their resources towards crops in which they face 
comparative advantages . Production of maize would, therefore , be 
concentrated in only those regions with comparative advantages in 
maize production and this would help to lower marketing costs as 
maize marketing activities get concentrated mainly in those areas. 
The maintenance of a constant price throughout the crop season 
provides no incentives to farmers for on-farm storage and when 
farmers sell all their crop at harvest time, a lot of pressure is 
exerted on the procurement, transportation and storage facilities 
during this peak period of the crop season . Private traders would 
also tend to buy only enough to sell immediately so that they incur 
very minimal storage costs. The continuation of such a situation 
would in fact greatly limit active private participation and the 
government agents would still continue to provide all the storage 
facilities and in effect, government agents, whose operations are 
tied to the government annual budget, would still remain the only 
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principle buyers of maize from farmers. Consequently, the 
efficiencies sought from competition in the marketing system would 
not be realized . 
The current differences in the producer and the consumer prices, 
where the producer price is higher than the consumer price, may also 
serve as a disincentive for more on-farm maize retention. A greater 
farm retention is critical for rural populations where retail outlets 
for mealie meal are very limited. The model incorporates these price 
differences by reflecting a lower maize sale price relative to the 
producer price. 
Suggestions for further research 
Revisions on the model could be made as more data becomes 
available. The policy concerns as portrayed in the constraint 
structure can be updated to reflect new directions and policy 
strategies. As was stated earlier, the analysis can be further 
improved with the addition of econometric modeling to analyze the 
effects of the environmental and policy factors that affect the maize 
system in Zambia . This is the part that was omitted in this study 
due to lack of adequate time series data . The general formulation of 
the model would involve estimating five equations and one identity to 
approximate maize marketing operations in Zambia. The equations to 
be estimated could be for: 
1. Total maize output (Q) 
2. Total maize absorption (D) 
3. Imports (IM) 
4. Maize purchases (MK) 
5. Maize sales (SL) 
The specific formulation could be as follows: 
(l) OS + MK + IM 
where 
SL + CS 
OS Maize opening stocks 
MK = Maize marketings 
IM Maize imports 
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SL = Maize sales by marketing agents 
cs = Maize closing stocks 
(2) Q f(PPMl, PPSl, FPl, ASM, RIM) 
where 
Q Total maize output 
PPMl = Deflated producer price of maize, lagged one year 
PPSl Def lated producer prices of major production substitutes 
of maize, lagged one year 
FPl = Deflated fertilizer prices, lagged one year 
ASM Area sown with maize 
RIM = Rainfall index for maize 
(3) MK f(Q) 
where 
MK 
Q 
( 4) SL 
where 
= Maize marketings 
= Total maize output 
f(CPM, CPS, CEX, MWP) 
SL = Total maize sales 
CPM = Deflated consumer price of maize 
CPS Deflated consumer prices of major maize substitutes 
CEX Aggregate real consumption expenditure 
MWP 
( 5) IM 
where 
Def lated maize wholesale price faced by millers 
f(IPM, MSS, FE) 
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IM Total maize imports 
IPM Deflated import price of maize 
MSS = Maize supply shortfall 
FE Foreign exchange available for food imports or total 
foreign aid utilized in the year 
(6) D 
where 
f(CPM, CPS, CEX) 
D Total maize absorption, i.e., net output (allowance for 
seed, feed and losses), net imports and government stock 
depletions 
CPM Deflated consumer price of maize 
CPS = Deflated consumer prices of major maize substitutes 
CEX Aggregate real consumption expenditure 
The reduced form of the model could then be used to make 
projections of maize output, purchases, imports, stocks, sales and 
the price of maize for the 16 projection years. The projections so 
obtained could then be incorporated in the dynamic optimization model 
to improve the quality of the coefficients. 
This type of specification is a slight revision, in the 
procurement function, of the specification used by Krishna and 
Chhibber (15) in their modeling of the dual wheat market in India 
which has an open market alongside the government run concessional 
food market that caters to low income people. 
The inclusion of stochastic specifications in the study would 
greatly improve the analysis, especially in dealing with long term 
strategies within the marketing system. However, more precision is 
achieved in this kind of study if simulations are done on a year by 
year basis. 
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Such yearly runs and analysis could prove useful for current 
government programs such as the early warning system which is used i n 
part to institute advance export or import programs based on the 
perceived maize inventory situation in the following year. 
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